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RESTRUCTURING OF DISCREATE LOGARITHM PROBLEM
AND ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM BY USING THE POWER
FIBONACCI SEQUENCE MODULE M
and CAGLA OZYILMAZ AND AYSE NALLI
Abstract. In this paper, we have studied on adapting to asymmetric cryp-
tography power Fibonacci sequence module m . To do this, We have re-
structed Discreate Logarithm Problem which is one of mathematical difficult
problems by using power Fibonacci sequence module m and by means of this
sequences, we have made the mathematical difficult problem which is used
only in prime modules is also useful for composite modules. Then we have
constructed cryptographic system based on this more difficult problem which
we have rearranged. Hence, we have obtained a new cryptosystem as ElGa-
mal Cryptosystem. Lastly, we have compared that ElGamal Cryptosystem
and a new cryptosystem which we constitute in terms of cryptography and we
have obtained that a new cryptosystem is more advantageuos than ElGamal
Cryptosystem.
1. Introduction
The fundamental objective of cryptography is to enable two people, usually
referred to as Alice and Bob, to communicate over an insecure channel in such a way
that an opponent, Oscar, can’t understand what is being said. This channel could
be a telephone line or computer network, for example. The information that Alice
wants to send to Bob, which we call ‘ plaintext ’, can be English text, numerical
data, or anything at all- its structure is completely arbitrary. Alice encrypts the
plaintext, using a predetermined key, and sends the resulting ciphertext over the
channel. Oscar, upon seeing the ciphertext in the channel by eavesdropping, can’t
determine what the plaintext was; but Bob, who knows the encryption key, can
decrypt the ciphertext and reconstruct the plaintext.
These ideas are described formally using the following mathematical notation.
Definition 1. A crptosystem is a five – tuple (P,C,K,E,D) where the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. P is a finite set of possible plaintexts;
2. C is a finite set of possible ciphertexts;
3. K is a finite set of possible keys;
4. For each K ∈ K, there is an encryption rule eK ∈ E and a corresponding
decryption rule dK ∈ D. Each eK : P −→ C and dK : C −→ P are functions
such that dK (eK (x)) = x for every plaintext element x ∈ P [1].
Fundamentally, there are two types of cryptosystems based on the manner in
which encryption-decryption is carried out in the system
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• Symmetric Cryptography (Secret key cryptosystems)
• Asymmetric Cryptography (Public key cryptosystems)
The main difference between these cryptosystems is the relationship between
the encryption and the decryption key. Logically, in any cryptosystem, both the
keys are closely associated. It is practically impossible to decrypt the ciphertext
with the key that is unrelated to the encryption key. Algorithms for symmetric
cryptography, such as DES [7], use a single key for both encryption and decryption
and algorithms for asymmetric cryptography, such as the RSA [6] and ElGamal
cryptosystem[4], use different keys for encryption and decryption.
At the very heart of cryptography is the notion of one way function, which was
shown to be necessary and sufficient for many cryptographic primitives.
A one-way function(OWF) is a function f such that for each x in the domain
of f , it is easy to compute f(x); but for essentially all y in the range of f , it is
computationally infeasible to find any x such that y = f(x).
The following are two examples of candidate one-way functions.
1. OWF multiplication of large primes: For primes p and q, f(p, q) = pq is a
one-way function: given p and q ,computing n = pq is easy; but given n, finding
p and q is difficult. The difficult direction is known as the integer factorization
problem, RSA and many other cryptographic systems rely on this example.
2. OWF exponentiation in prime fields: Given a generator α of Z∗p for most
appropriately large prime p, f(a) = α
a
(mod p) is a one-way function. f(a) is
easily computed given α, a, p and ; but for most choices p it is difficult, given ( y;
α; p), to find a an in the range 1 ≤ a ≤ p − 1 such that α
a
(mod p) = y. The
difficult direction is known as the Discrete Logarithm problem.
However, a one-way function is not sufficient for public-key cryptography if it
is equally hard for the legitimate receiver and the adversary to invert. So rather,
we need a trapdoor one-way function. A trapdoor one-way function is a one-way
function where the inverse direction is easy, given a certain piece of information (the
trapdoor), but difficult otherwise. Public-key cryptosystems are based on trapdoor
one-way functions. The public key gives information about the particular instance
of the function; the private key gives information about the trapdoor [3].
Now, we cite public-key cryptosystems based on the Discrete Logarithm
problem. The first and best-known of these is the ElGamal Cryptosystem. ElGa-
mal proposed a public-key cryptosystem which is based on the Discrete Logarithm
problem in ( Z∗p, .). The encryption operation in the ElGamal Cryptosystem is
randomized, since ciphertext depends on both the plaintext x and on the random
value k chosen by Alice. Hence, there will be many ciphertexts that are encryptions
of the same plaintext.
ElGamal Cryptosystem is presented below:
Let p be a prime number such that the Discrete Logarithm problem in ( Z∗p, .)
is infeasible, and let α ∈ Z∗p be a primitive element. Let P = Z
∗
p, C = Z
∗
p × Z
∗
p ,
and define K = {(p, α, a, β) : β ≡ α
a
(mod p)} . The values p, α, β are
the public key, and a is the private key. For K = (p, α, a, β), and for a (secret)
random number k ∈ Zp−1, define eK (x, k) = (y1 , y2) , where
y1 = α
k
(mod p)y2 = xβ
k
(mod p)
For y1 , y2 ∈ Z
∗
p, define dK (y1 , y2) = y2 (y1
a)
−1
(mod p).
3A small example will illustrate the computations performed in the ElGamal
Cryptosystem.
Suppose p = 2579 and α = 2.
α is a primitive element module p . Let a = 765, so β = 2765(mod 2579) = 949.
Now, suppose that Alice wishes to send the message x = 1299 to Bob. Say
k = 853 is the random integer she chooses. Then she computes
y1 = α
k
(mod p) = 2
853
(mod 2579) = 435
y2 = xβ
k
(mod p) = 1299.949853 (mod 2579) = 2396
Alice sends y = (y1 , y2) = (435 , 2396) to Bob.
When Bob receives the ciphertext y = (435 , 2396), he computes
x = y2 (y1
a)
−1
(mod p) = 2396.
(
435765
)
−1
(mod 2579) = 1299
which was the plaintext that Alice encrypted[1].
2. Power Fibonacci Sequences
Let G be a bi-infinite integer sequence satisfying the recurrence relation Gn =
Gn−1 + Gn−2. If G ≡ 1, α, α
2, α3, ...(mod m) for some modulus m , then G is
called a power Fibonacci sequence modulo [2].
Example 1. Modulo m = 19, there are two power Fibonacci sequences: 1, 15, 16,
12, 9, 2, 11, 13, 5, 18, 4, 3, 7, 10, 17, 8, 6, 14, 1, 15. . . and 1, 5, 6, 11, 17, 9,
7, 16, 4, 1, 5, . . .
Curiously, the second is a subsequence of the first. Ide and Renault, in their
paper, obtained for modulo 5 there is only one such sequence (1, 3, 4, 2, 1, 3, ...),
for modulo 10 there are no such sequences, and for modulo 209 there are four of
these sequences. Thus, they obtained the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There is exactly one power Fibonacci sequence modulo 5. For m 6= 5,
there exist power Fibonacci sequences modulo m precisely when m has prime fac-
torization m = pe1
1
.pe2
2
...pekk or m = 5p
e1
1
.pe2
2
...pekk , where each pi ≡ ±1(mod 10);
in either case there are exactly 2k power Fibonacci sequences modulo m[2].
In this paper, we have examined power Fibonaci sequences modulo m and we
have obtained that a power Fibonaci sequence modulo m constitutes a cyclic and
multiplicative group whose order is a divisor of ϕ(m) at the same time. That is,
If G ≡ 1, α, α2, α3, ...(mod m) is a power Fibonacci sequence module m, the power
Fibonacci sequence constitutes a cyclic and multiplicative group whose generator
is α . This sequence is a subgroup of Z∗m( Z
∗
m = {x ∈ Zm : (x,m) = 1 }).
In addition when we examine to mathematical difficult problems which are used
asymmetric cryptography, we get a generator is necessary for the Discrete Loga-
rithm problem. When we have thought all these things together, we have obtained
that we can rearrenge Discrete Logarithm problem by using the power Fibonacci
sequence module m and so we can rearrenge ElGamal Cryptosystem based on the
Discrete Logarithm problem. Thus, we have made that the Discrete Logarithm
problem and ElGamal Cryptosystem which is used only in prime modulus is also
usable for composite modulus.
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Moreover, there are two limits in the ElGamal cryptosystem. One is that the
plaintext must be less than p− 1[5]. So then if m is chosen a composite number by
using the power Fibonacci sequence module m, how does this limit in the ElGamal
cryptosystem change? To obtain the answer of this question, firstly we define new
Discrete Logarithm problem by using the power Fibonacci sequence module m and
then we constitute a new ElGamal Cryptosystem based on new Discrete Logarithm
problem.
Definition 2. Given a generator α of a chosen subgroup of Z∗m for most appro-
priately large m ( according to Theorem 1, we have found most appropriately large
module m ), f(λ) = α
λ
(mod m) is a one-way function. f(λ) is easily computed
given λ,α , and m; but for most choices m it is difficult, given ( y; m ; α), to
find an λ such that α
λ
(mod m) = y. We have called difficult direction as the
Discrete Logarithm problem with Power Fibonacci Sequence module m.
Now, we will obtain public-key cryptosystem based on the Discrete Logarithm
problem with Power Fibonacci Sequence module m. We have called the cryptosys-
tem as the ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power Fibonacci Sequence module m .
ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power Fibonacci Sequence module m is presented
below:
Let m be a positive integer such that the Discrete Logarithm problem with
Power Fibonacci Sequence module m in a chosen subgroup of ( Z∗m, .) ( m is
one of modulus for which power Fibonacci sequences exist) is infeasible, and let
α ∈ (the chosen subgroup of Z∗m) be a primitive element(generator). Let
P = Zm/ {0}, C = (the chosen subgroup of Z
∗
m) × Zm/ {0} , and define
K = {(m, α, λ, β) : β ≡ α
λ
(mod m)} . The values m, α, β are the public
key, and λ is the private key. For K = (m, α, λ, β), and for a (secret) random
number k ∈ Zthe order of the chosen subgroup , define eK (x, k) = (y1 , y2) , where
y1 = α
k
(mod m)y2 = xβ
k
(mod m)
For (y1 , y2) ∈ C, define dK (y1 , y2) = y2
(
y1
λ
)
−1
(mod m).
Thus, if we look closely, while α ∈ Z∗p, the plaintext must be less than p −
1 (P = Z∗p) the ElGamal cryptosystem, α ∈ (the chosen subgroup of Z
∗
m) , the
plaintext must be less than m−1 ( P = Zm/ {0}) in ElGamal Cryptpsystem with
Power Fibonacci Sequence module m. In addition, we know that if in ElGamal
Cryptpsystem p is a large prime number , in ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power
Fibonacci Sequence module m , m is more large number( m = pe1
1
.pe2
2
...pekk or
m = 5pe1
1
.pe2
2
...pekk , for each pi ≡ ±1(mod 10) is large prime number ). That is, if
we choose m a composite number by using the power Fibonacci sequence module
m, we obtained that for the answer of the question of how this limit in the ElGamal
cryptosystem change in new cryptosystem which we constitute this limit decrease
asm increases. So, ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power Fibonacci Sequence module
m which we constitute is more advantageous than ElGamal Cryptpsystem in terms
of cryptography.
3. An application of ElGamal Cryptosystem with Power Fibonacci
Sequence Module M
Small examples illustrates following.
5Example 2. Suppose m = 209 which provides Theorem 1 and so
Z
∗
209 = {x ∈ Z209 : (x, 209) = 1 }.
Module m = 209 , there are four power Fibonacci sequences:
1, 15, 16, 31, 47, 78, 125, 203, 119, 113, 23, 136, 159, 86, 36, 122, 158, 71, 20,
91, 111, 202, 104, 97, 201, 89, 81, 170, 42, 3, 45, 48, 93, 141, 25, 166, 191, 148,
130, 69, 199, 59, 49, 108, 157, 56, 4, 60, 64, 124, 188, 103, 82, 185, 58, 34, 92,
126, 9,135, 144, 70, 5, 75, 80, 155, 26, 181, 207, 179, 177, 147, 115, 53, 168, 12,
180, 192, 163, 146, 100, 37, 137, 174, 102, 67, 169, 27, 196, 14, 1, 15, . . .
1, 81, 82, 163, 36, 199, 26, 16, 42, 58, 100, 158, 49, 207, 47, 45, 92, 137, 20,
157, 177, 125, 93, 9, 102, 111, 4, 115, 119, 25, 144, 169, 104, 64, 168, 23, 191, 5,
196, 201, 188, 180, 159, 130, 80, 1, 81, . . .
1, 129, 130, 50, 180, 21, 201, 13, 5, 18, 23, 41, 64, 105, 169, 65, 25, 90, 115,
205, 111, 107, 9, 116, 125, 32, 157, 189, 137, 117, 45, 162, 207, 160, 158, 109,
58, 167, 16, 183, 199, 173, 163, 127, 81, 208, 80, 79, 159, 29, 188, 8, 196, 204,
191, 186, 168, 145, 104, 40, 144, 184, 119, 94, 4, 98, 102, 200, 93, 84, 177, 52,
20, 72, 92, 164, 47, 2, 49, 51, 100, 151, 42, 193, 26, 10, 36, 46, 82, 128, 1, 129,
. . . and
1, 195, 196, 182, 169, 142, 102, 35, 137, 172, 100, 63, 163, 17, 180, 197, 168,
156, 115, 62, 177, 30, 207, 28, 26, 54, 80, 134, 5, 139, 144, 74, 9, 83, 92, 175, 58,
24, 82, 106, 188, 85, 64, 149, 4, 153, 157, 101, 49, 150, 199, 140, 130, 61, 191,
43, 25, 68, 93, 161, 45, 206, 42, 39, 81, 120, 201, 112, 104, 7, 111, 118, 20, 138,
158, 87, 36, 123, 159, 73, 23, 96, 119, 6, 125, 131, 47, 178, 16, 194, 1, 195, . . .
We have choosed one of these power Fibonacci sequences.
Curiously, {1, 15, 16, 31, 47, 78, 125, 203, 119, 113, 23, 136, 159, 86, 36, 122,
158, 71, 20, 91, 111, 202, 104, 97, 201, 89, 81, 170, 42, 3, 45, 48, 93, 141, 25, 166,
191, 148, 130, 69, 199, 59, 49, 108, 157, 56, 4, 60, 64, 124, 188, 103, 82, 185, 58,
34, 92, 126, 9,135, 144, 70, 5, 75, 80, 155, 26, 181, 207, 179, 177, 147, 115, 53,
168, 12, 180, 192, 163, 146, 100, 37, 137, 174, 102, 67, 169, 27, 196, 14} is both
a subgroup of Z∗209 and a power Fibonacci sequence modulo 209 . α is a primitive
element of the chosen subgroup of Z∗m. So, the primitive element α = 15.
Let λ = 78 , so β = 1578(mod 209) = 163
Now, suppose that Alice wishes to send the message x = 201 to Bob. Say k = 67
is the random integer she chooses. Then she computes
y1 = α
k
(mod m) = 15
67
(mod 209) = 181
y2 = xβ
k
(mod m) = 201.16367 (mod 209) = 201.125(mod 209) = 45
Alice sends y = (y1 , y2) = (181 , 45) to Bob. When Bob receives the ciphertext
y = (181 , 45), he computes
x = y2
(
y1
λ
)
−1
(mod m) = 45.
(
18178
)
−1
(mod 209) = 45. (125)
−1
(mod 209)
= 45.102(mod 209) = 201
which was the plaintext that Alice encrypted.
Example 3. Suppose m = 1045 which provides Theorem 1 and so Z∗1045 = {x ∈
Z1045 : (x, 1045) = 1 }.
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Module m = 1045, there are four power Fibonacci sequences:
1, 338, 339, 677, 1016, 648, 619, 222, 841, 18, 859, 877, 691, 523, 169, 692,
861, 508, 324, 832, 111, 943, 9, 952, 961, 868, 784, 607, 346, 953, 254, 162, 416,
578, 994, 527, 476, 1003, 434, 392, 826, 173, 999, 127, 81, 208, 289, 497, 786,
238, 1024, 217, 196, 413, 609, 1022, 586, 563, 104, 667, 771, 393, 119, 512, 631,
98, 729, 827, 511, 293, 804, 52, 856, 908, 719, 582, 256, 838, 49, 887, 936, 778,
669, 402, 26, 428, 454, 882, 291, 128, 419, 547, 966, 468, 389, 857, 201, 13, 214,
227, 441, 668, 64, 732, 796, 483, 234, 717, 951, 623, 529, 107, 636, 743, 334, 32,
366, 398, 764, 117, 881, 998, 834, 787, 576, 318, 894, 167, 16, 183, 199, 382, 581,
963, 499, 417, 916, 288, 159, 447, 606, 8, 614, 622, 191, 813, 1004, 772, 731, 458,
144, 602, 746, 303, 4, 307, 311, 618, 929, 502, 386, 888, 229, 72, 301, 373, 674,
2, 676, 678, 309, 987, 251, 193, 444, 637, 36, 673, 709, 337, 1, 338, . . .
1, 433, 434, 867, 256, 78, 334, 412, 746, 113, 859, 972, 786, 713, 454, 122,
576, 698, 229, 927, 111, 1038, 104, 97, 201, 298, 499, 797, 251, 3, 254, 257, 511,
768, 234, 1002, 191, 148, 339, 487, 826, 268, 49, 317, 366, 683, 4, 687, 691, 333,
1024, 312, 291, 603, 894, 452, 301, 753, 9, 762, 771, 488, 214, 702, 916, 573, 444,
1017, 416, 388, 804, 147, 951, 53, 1004, 12, 1016, 1028, 999, 982, 936, 873, 764,
592, 311, 903, 169, 27, 196, 223, 419, 642, 16, 658, 674, 287, 961, 203, 119, 322,
441, 763, 159, 922, 36, 958, 994, 907, 856, 718, 529, 202, 731, 933, 619, 507, 81,
588, 669, 212, 881, 48, 929, 977, 861, 793, 609, 357, 966, 278, 199, 477, 676, 108,
784, 892, 631, 478, 64, 542, 606, 103, 709, 812, 476, 243, 719, 962, 636, 553, 144,
697, 841, 493, 289, 782, 26, 808, 834, 597, 386, 983, 324, 262, 586, 848, 389, 192,
581, 773, 309, 37, 346, 383, 729, 67, 796, 863, 614, 432, 1, 433, . . .
1, 613, 614, 182, 796, 978, 729, 662, 346, 1008, 309, 272, 581, 853, 389, 197,
586, 783, 324, 62, 386, 448, 834, 237, 26, 263, 289, 552, 841, 348, 144, 492, 636,
83, 719, 802, 476, 233, 709, 942, 606, 503, 64, 567, 631, 153, 784, 937, 676, 568,
199, 767, 966, 688, 609, 252, 861, 68, 929, 997, 881, 833, 669, 457, 81, 538, 619,
112, 731, 843, 529, 327, 856, 138, 994, 87, 36, 123, 159, 282, 441, 723, 119, 842,
961, 758, 674, 387, 16, 403, 419, 822, 196, 1018, 169, 142, 311, 453, 764, 172,
936, 63, 999, 17, 1016, 1033, 1004, 992, 951, 898, 804, 657, 416, 28, 444, 472,
916, 343, 214, 557, 771, 283, 9, 292, 301, 593, 894, 442, 291, 733, 1024, 712, 691,
358, 4, 362, 366, 728, 49, 777, 826, 558, 339, 897, 191, 43, 234, 277, 511, 788,
254, 1042, 251, 248, 499, 747, 201, 948, 104, 7, 111, 118, 229, 347, 576, 923, 454,
332, 786, 73, 859, 932, 746, 633, 334, 967, 256, 178, 434, 612, 1, 613, . . . and
1, 708, 709, 372, 36, 408, 444, 852, 251, 58, 309, 367, 676, 1043, 674, 672,
301, 973, 229, 157, 386, 543, 929, 427, 311, 738, 4, 742, 746, 443, 144, 587, 731,
273, 1004, 232, 191, 423, 614, 1037, 606, 598, 159, 757, 916, 628, 499, 82, 581,
663, 199, 862, 16, 878, 894, 727, 576, 258, 834, 47, 881, 928, 764, 647, 366, 1013,
334, 302, 636, 938, 529, 422, 951, 328, 234, 562, 796, 313, 64, 377, 441, 818, 214,
1032, 201, 188, 389, 577, 966, 498, 419, 917, 291, 163, 454, 617, 26, 643, 669,
267, 936, 158, 49, 207, 256, 463, 719, 137, 856, 993, 804, 752, 511, 218, 729, 947,
631, 533, 119, 652, 771, 378, 104, 482, 586, 23, 609, 632, 196, 828, 1024, 807,
786, 548, 289, 837, 81, 918, 999, 872, 826, 653, 434, 42, 476, 518, 994, 467, 416,
883, 254, 92, 346, 438, 784, 177, 961, 93, 9, 102, 111, 213, 324, 537, 861, 353,
169, 522, 691, 168, 859, 1027, 841, 823, 619, 397, 1016, 368, 339, 707, 1, 708, . . .
We have choosed one of these power Fibonacci sequences.
Curiously, {1, 338, 339, 677, 1016, 648, 619, 222, 841, 18, 859, 877, 691, 523,
169, 692, 861, 508, 324, 832, 111, 943, 9, 952, 961, 868, 784, 607, 346, 953, 254,
7162, 416, 578, 994, 527, 476, 1003, 434, 392, 826, 173, 999, 127, 81, 208, 289,
497, 786, 238, 1024, 217, 196, 413, 609, 1022, 586, 563, 104, 667, 771, 393, 119,
512, 631, 98, 729, 827, 511, 293, 804, 52, 856, 908, 719, 582, 256, 838, 49, 887,
936, 778, 669, 402, 26, 428, 454, 882, 291, 128, 419, 547, 966, 468, 389, 857, 201,
13, 214, 227, 441, 668, 64, 732, 796, 483, 234, 717, 951, 623, 529, 107, 636, 743,
334, 32, 366, 398, 764, 117, 881, 998, 834, 787, 576, 318, 894, 167, 16, 183, 199,
382, 581, 963, 499, 417, 916, 288, 159, 447, 606, 8, 614, 622, 191, 813, 1004, 772,
731, 458, 144, 602, 746, 303, 4, 307, 311, 618, 929, 502, 386, 888, 229, 72, 301,
373, 674, 2, 676, 678, 309, 987, 251, 193, 444, 637, 36, 673, 709, 337} is both a
subgroup of Z∗1045 and a power Fibonacci sequence modulo 1045 . α is a primitive
element of the chosen subgroup of Z∗m. So, the primitive element α = 338.
Let λ = 547 , so β = 338547(mod 1045) = 222.
Now, suppose that Alice wishes to send the message x = 1001 to Bob. Say
k = 162 is the random integer she chooses. Then she computes
y1 = α
k
(mod m) = 338
162
(mod 1045) = 229
y2 = xβ
k
(mod m) = 1001.222162 (mod 1045) = 1001.609(mod 1045) = 374
Alice sends y = (y1 , y2) = (229 , 374) to Bob. When Bob receives the ciphertext
y = (229 , 374), he computes
x = y2
(
y1
λ
)−1
(mod m) = 374.
(
229547
)
−1
(mod 1045) = 374. (609)−1 (mod 1045)
= 374.894(mod 209) = 1001
which was the plaintext that Alice encrypted.
4. Conclusion
In this study, we have adapted to public key cryptography power Fibonacci se-
quence module m. To do this, we have examined power Fibonacci sequence module
m and we have obtained that a power Fibonaci sequence modulo m constitutes a
cyclic and multiplicative group whose order is a divisor of ϕ(m) at the same time.
So, we have obtained that we are able to reconstitute Discrete Logarithm problem
by using the power Fibonacci sequence module m . Thus, we got new difficult
problem, and we called this problem as Discrete Logarithm problem with Power
Fibonacci Sequence module m , then we have constructed a new cryptosystem
based on the new problem similar to ElGamal Crptosystem, and we called the new
cryptographic system as ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power Fibonacci Sequence
module m .
In addition one of two limits in the ElGamal cryptosystem is that the plaintext
must be less than p − 1[5]. We have compared that ElGamal Cryptpsystem and
ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power Fibonacci Sequence module m in terms of this
limit and we have obtained that while α ∈ Z∗p, the plaintext must be less than
p− 1(P = Z∗p) in the ElGamal cryptosystem, α ∈ (the chosen subgroup of Z
∗
m) ,
the plaintext must be less than m− 1 (P = Zm/ {0}) in ElGamal Cryptpsystem
with Power Fibonacci Sequence module m. Moreover, we know that if in ElGamal
Cryptpsystem p is a large prime number , in ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power
Fibonacci Sequence module m , m is more large number (m = pe1
1
.pe2
2
...pekk or
m = 5pe1
1
.pe2
2
...pekk , for each pi ≡ ±1(mod 10) is large prime number . That is, if
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we choose m a composite number by using the power Fibonacci sequence module
m , we obtained that this limit decrease as m increases.
So, by means of the new cryptosystem, we have made that the cryptosystem
which is used only in prime modulus is also usable for composite modulus and
also the new cryptosystem which we defined is more advantages than ElGamal
Cryptpsystem in terms of crptography. Because, in comparison with ElGamal
Cryptpsystem, for one who doesn’t know the private key the number of data which
must try to understand the message increase in ElGamal Cryptpsystem with Power
Fibonacci Sequence module m.
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